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INEQUITABLE CONDUCT: PERSISTENT
PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDED
RESOLUTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
There are several equitable defenses that precludes a patent owner
from recovering for infringement, including unclean hands,' estoppel,
2
and laches.3 The doctrine of unclean hands can further be distinguished
into patent misuse4 and inequitable conduct.5 Inequitable conduct, often
referred to as a breach of the duty of candor and fraud on the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO),7 is a frequently asserted defense to patent
infringement! Inequitable conduct is a defense to infringement that oc-
curs when the certain individuals associated with a patent prosecution
1. The doctrine of unclean hands evolved from requirements of conscience and good
faith, and gives a court of equity discretion to refuse aid to claimants who do not come with
"clean hands." See Precision Instrument Mfg. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806, 814 (1945).
2. Estoppel is an equitable defense that arises where the alleged infringer is materially
prejudiced by relying on a patent owners misleading intent as to enforcing his patent rights.
See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en
banc).
3. The defense of Iaches arises where the alleged infringer is materially prejudiced by
the patent owner's unreasonable and inexcusable delay in filing suit. See id. at 1032.
4. Patent misuse is a defense against allegations of infringement where the patent
owner's conduct violates antitrust laws or expands the scope of the patent rights and has an
anti-competitive effect. See Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868-69 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
5. Inequitable conduct may also constitute grounds for liability on the part of the pat-
entee as a "Walker Process Claim." Walker Process Claims are distinguished from inequita-
ble conduct in that they constitute antitrust liability premised on affirmative misrepresenta-
tions, or knowing and willful fraud on the PTO. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food
Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965); see also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d
1340, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 129 F.3d 1463,
1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Thus, "inequitable conduct that will render a patent unenforceable is a
broader, more inclusive concept than the fraud needed to support a Walker Process counter-
claim." Nobelpharma, 129 F.3d at 1473.
6. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1997).
7. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson Co., 745 F.2d 1437, 1449 (Fed. Cir.
1984). Fraud on the PTO is somewhat misleading because inequitable conduct is different
than common law fraud; inequitable conduct is broader than common law fraud, has different
elements, and is a different offense. See C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1364-65; infra note 17.
8. See Kimberly-Clark, 745 F.2d at 1454 ("'Fraud in the PTO' has been overplayed, is
appearing in nearly every patent suit, and is cluttering up the patent system.").
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violate a duty of candor by intentionally disclosing or failing to disclose
or misrepresenting certain information.9 Specifically, applicants have a
duty to disclose information that is material to the patentability of an in-
vention. A breach of the duty of candor occurs before the application
issues as a patent, that-is, prior to or during the time the application is
being examined by the PTO.'0
With the relaxation of requirements for asserting an inequitable
conduct defense, the Federal Circuit inadvertently provided a "plague"
of inequitable conduct charges." To be sure, acquisition of a patent by
improper means inflicts damage on the patent system, patentees, the
courts, third parties, and the society at large.'2 The patent system is
damaged by being violated, circumvented, or exploited. Also, patentees
who are wrongly accused of inequitable conduct may suffer through
wasteful and expensive litigation that distracts them from further inno-
vation, and potentially tainting their reputation. The courts are im-
paired due to a myriad of needless inequitable defenses and appeals.
Even third parties, such as consumers and inventors, are harmed by ex-
cessive use of the inequitable conduct defense because it places a cloud
9. See 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03 (1998).
10. The application proceeding before the PTO is often called "patent prosecution." In
order for an application to issue as a patent, the application must meet certain disclosure re-
quirements. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (requiring the application's specification to include a
written description of the invention sufficient to enable any person skilled in the art to make
and use the claimed invention, and include the best mode to carry out the claimed invention).
Also, the claimed invention must meet several conditions of patentability. See 35 U.S.C. §§
101-103 (1994). Section 101, in general, requires the claimed invention to constitute patent-
able subject matter and have general, beneficial, and practical utility. See Brenner v. Manson,
383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966). Section 102 contains dual requirements: novelty and loss of right.
35 U.S.C. § 102. First, the claimed invention must be novel; that is, each element of the claim
is not found in a single prior art reference. In other words, the claimed invention is antici-
pated, or not novel, when each element of the claimed invention is found in a single prior art
reference prior to the date of invention. Second, there must be no loss of right to the inven-
tion claimed; for example, the'invention was not on-sale or in public use by the inventor more
than one year before filing the patent application. Section 103 requires the invention not be
obvious in light of the scope and content of the prior art, persons having ordinary skill in the
pertinent art, and secondary considerations; that is, multiple prior art references cannot be
combined to form the claimed invention. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17
(1966). The burden is on the PTO examiner to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the claimed invention does not meet a condition of patentability.
11. See Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Liti-
gation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 85-86 (1993); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849
F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
12. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Akron
Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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over the enforceability 3 of the patent and may delay a finding of inva-
lidity. Society at large is damaged when it receives a poor bargain and
has to pay for the effect of a patent in terms of monopolistic exclusivity
and high prices. 4
Inequitable conduct occurs where a patent applicant15 defrauds the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 6 by affirmatively misrepresenting
or by omitting information that may be relevant to the patentability of
their invention. 7 Although considered fraud on the PTO, inequitable
conduct involves a lower standard than the standard applied to common
law fraud . In response to such mendacious conduct, the courts turn to
13. The effect of inequitable conduct renders a patent unenforceable for the life of the
patent, rather than invalid. See discussion infra Part III.C.
14. Patents represent a quid pro quo between the government/society and the inventor.
In exchange for complete disclosure of an invention, the inventor receives the ability to ex-
clude others from use for a period of twenty years from the date of application. See Rohm &
Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556,1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
15. Throughout this Comment, "applicant" is meant to include all persons that have a
duty of candor under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c) (1997). Specifically, persons with a duty include
[e]ach inventor named in the application; [e]ach attorney or agent who prepares or
prosecutes the application; and [e]very other person who is substantively involved in
the preparation or prosecution of the application and who is associated with the in-
ventor, with the assignee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the
application.
Id.; see also infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
16. Although the Patent Office was not renamed the Patent and Trademark Office until
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-596 § 1, 88 Stat. 1949 (1975), I refer to the entity of patent granting
agency of the United States as the Patent Trademark Office, or PTO.
17. Inequitable conduct is also referred to as a breach of a duty of candor and as fraud
on the PTO. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1997); Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment
and Inequitable Conduct in Patent Procuremen A Nutshell a Review of Recent Federal Cir-
cuit Cases and a Plea for Modest Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
277, 293 (1997) [hereinafter Inequitable Conduct in Patent Procurement]. Courts adopted
"inequitable conduct" to indicate its special application to patent applications. See J.P. Stev-
ens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984); cf. Precision Instrument Mfg.
v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,815 (1945).
18. See J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559 (fraud on the PTO is called inequitable conduct
because the "fraud" label can be confused with other forms of conduct); Orthopedic Equip.
Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, 707 F.2d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1983). "The tort of fraud
requires that there was a successful deception, and action taken by the person deceived that
would not have otherwise been taken." C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1364
(Fed. Cir. 1998). The elements of common law fraud are: (1) misrepresentation of a material
fact; (2) intent to deceive or scienter; (3) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation by the
party deceived; and (4) injury caused by reliance on the misrepresentation. See generally
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
("Here, however, because an applicant's misrepresentation or failure to meet his duty to dis-
close to the Office information.., which is material will not in itself render a patent invalid or
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the doctrine having the "equitable maxim that 'he who comes into eq-
uity must come with clean hands."'19
The duty of candor provides that certain individuals affiliated with a
patent application have positive and negative duties related to submit-
ting information. ° Inequitable conduct occurs where there is a breach
of this duty.1 Inequitable conduct relates to the violation of a patent
applicant's duty to disclose to the PTO information known to the pat-
entee that is material to the examination of a patent application.2 Put
another way, the application and individuals associated with the applica-
tion are to refrain from misrepresenting, falsifying, or withholding mate-
rial information for the purpose of acquiring patent rights.2 The courts
and Federal Circuit judges disagree as to the proper legal standard for
inequitable conduct, thereby causing a varied application.
Debate regarding inequitable conduct arises from several places, in-
cluding its sporadic evolution over the years; the Federal Circuit's strug-
gle to root out fraud on the PTO yet rein in the excessive, frivolous alle-
gations of fraud; and the PTO's recent amendment to the regulation that
unenforceable.... ."). Applying common law fraud to patent prosecution, the Federal Circuit
in C.R. Bard required
(1) a false representation or deliberate omission of a fact material to patentability,
(2) made with the intent to deceive the patent examiner, (3) on which the examiner
justifiably relied in granting the patent, and (4) but for which misrepresentation or
deliberate omission the patent would not have been granted.
C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1364. Like inequitable conduct, fraud renders a patent unenforceable.
See id Inequitable conduct, however, is broader than common law fraud because the failure
to disclose material information or submission of false information does not require reliance
on the part of the PTO or examiner. See C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1365; J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at
1559. Unlike inequitable conduct, good faith, alone, is a defense to the charge of common
law fraud. Compare C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1365 ("Good faith is an absolute defense to the
charge of common law fraud."), with Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1330
(Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[G]ood faith is only one factor to be considered .... ).
19. Precision, 324 U.S. at 814 ("[The] doctrine is rooted in the historical concept of court
of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience and good
faith."). Further, the Court stated that "'equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led
blameless lives,' ... it does require that they shall have acted fairly and without fraud or de-
ceit as to the controversy in issue." Id. at 814-15 (citations omitted).
20. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1997).
21. See J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559.
22. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (en banc).
23. See Baxter Int'l, 149 F.3d at 1327 ("Inequitable conduct includes affirmative misrep-
resentations of a material fact, failure to disclose material information, or submission of false
material information, coupled with an intent to deceive."); Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48
F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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provides a guideline for determining an element of inequitable con-
duct.24 This struggle has caused narrow and inconsistent interpretations
of the rule, which confuses patent applicants, complicates patent prose-
cution, and misleads district court judges.
This Comment examines the evolution of inequitable conduct, the
state of the law today, identifies the issues that arise from inequitable
conduct defense and ethical implications that necessarily arise, and of-
fers an analysis to address recent guideline revisions and some of the
persistent problems found in inequitable conduct. Part II begins by sur-
veying the history of inequitable conduct. Part III then examines the le-
gal standard and the new amendments of inequitable conduct in the
Federal Circuit today. Finally, Part IV offers my analysis and recom-
mends resolutions to the persistent problems.
II. EARLY INEQUITABLE CONDUCe
To understand inequitable conduct today, it is useful to first consider
how the standard has evolved. Legislatures have recognized inequitable
conduct in statutory form since the Patent Act of 1790.2 The 1790 stat-
ute allowed a private cause of action, filed within one year of issuance,
to repeal a patent that was "obtained surreptitiously by or upon false
suggestion. ' The Patent Act of 1793 extended the period that such a
lawsuit could be filed to three years.? In the Patent Act of 1836, Con-
gress replaced the private cause of action with a defense against in-
fringement that claimed the patent was obtained improperly.29 The
Consolidated Patent Act of 1870 broadened the defense and made it
available against an issued patent that was procured by a deceptive ap-
plication.3 The current statute3' provides an alleged infringer a defense
that the patent is unenforceable because there was a lack of candor or
breach of a duty to disclose certain information during the prosecution
24. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992).
25. For a comprehensive review of the history of inequitable conduct, see Goldman, su-
pra note 11, at 37 et seq.
26. See Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 stat. 109-112 (1790).
27. Id. at 111.
28. See Act of Feb. 21,1793, ch. 11, § 10,1 stat. 318-323 (1793).
29. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 15, 5 stat. 117 (1836) (reinstating the examination
of applications prior to granting patents).
30. See Consolidated Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61,16 Stat. 198-209 (1870).
31. See 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1952) (enacted under the Patent Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 792 (July 19,
1952)).
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of the patent.32
Despite provisions in the patent statutes for a cause of action or a
defense against infringement, the courts were reluctant to find that a
patent was procured by fraud.33 It was not until 1945 that the Supreme
Court recognized that the public interest was damaged by patents that
are procured by fraud. 4 The Precision Court stated that "[t]hose who
have applications pending with the Patent Office or who are parties to
Patent Office proceedings have an uncompromising duty to report to it
all facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness underlying the ap-
plications in issue."35 The Court justified its decision under the unclean
hands doctrine.36
Today, the two basic elements of inequitable conduct are materiality
and intent. Inequitable conduct occurs when individuals associated with
the filing or prosecution of a patent application breach a duty of candor
to the PTO by intentionally not disclosing or misrepresenting disclosed
material information.37 Early cases addressing inequitable conduct, in-
cluding those after the 1952 Patent Act, interpreted "materiality" to
mean anticipatory prior art.38 This standard, not surprisingly, was re-
32. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994).
33. Early court decisions took an unfavorable view of the defense of inequitable con-
duct. In Rubber Company v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788 (1869), the Supreme Court con-
strued the patent code as only allowing the government the standing to seek cancellation due
to fraud and prohibited the use of the defense because the defendant was sued in the court of
equity, not a court of law. See also Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434 (1871); Steinfur
Patents Corp. v. J. Meyerson, Inc., 56 F.2d 372 (E.D.N.Y. 1931), modified by 62 F.2d 238 (2d
Cir. 1932). It was not until 1870 that Congress made it clear that the defense of inequitable
conduct is available in courts of law and equity. The Consolidation Patent Act of 1870, 16
Stat. 198-209 (today this provision is found in 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994)); see also United States
v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888) (Supreme Court recognizes defense in equity).
It was not until Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933) (patent
attained without disclosure of a prior use), that the Court began recognizing that a patent ap-
plicant's conduct may have an adverse effect on the public interest.
34. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 815 (1945); cf. Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) (discussing inequita-
ble conduct in dictum).
35. Precision, 324 U.S. at 818.
36. See id at 819. The unclean hands doctrine provides that one who seeks relief in eq-
uity must enter untainted by bad faith or inequitableness relative to matters for which relief is
sought. See id. at 814-15; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text. Such misconduct does
not need to give rise to criminal or civil liability, rather any willful conduct, related to the
cause of action, that "transgress[es] equitable standards .... " Precision, 324 U.S. at 815.
37. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1997).
38. See Goldman, supra note 11, at 56 (citing Oglebay Norton Co. v. Universal Refracto-
ries Corp., 300 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. Wis. 1969)); see, e.g., United States v. Standard Elect.
Time Co., 155 F. Supp. 949 (D. Mass. 1957).
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laxed through later cases." Accordingly, the standard for materiality
evolved in the courts from considering only "anticipatory" prior art to
information that pertains to the patentability of the claimed invention,
including prior art that may render a patent "obvious" and other highly
relevant information.4"
Similarly, the element of intent has undergone variable application
by the courts. After Precision, courts were skeptical of evidentiary
proof of intent solely based on an inference of fraudulent intent." In
later cases, the courts considered "gross negligence" sufficient to satisfy
the requisite element of intent.4 2 In 1982, the Federal Circuit was cre-
ated43 and initially endorsed the gross negligence standard;' however,
the resulting frequency of the allegation of inequitable conduct was con-
sidered inauspicious and to be discouraged. 4 To discourage inauspi-
cious use of inequitable conduct defenses, the Federal Circuit, in FMC
Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., began moving away from inferring intent under
a gross negligence standard.' Today, gross negligence alone is not suffi-
cient to infer intent to deceive, rather "the involved conduct, viewed in
light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith,
must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to de-
ceive."47
39. See, e.g., Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc., 479 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1973);
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 426 F.2d 1117 (6th Cir. 1970); Monolith Port-
land Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1961).
40. See Goldman, supra note 11, at 57-58.
41. See, e.g., Martin v. Ford Alexander Corp., 160 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (dis-
missing the defense despite having an affidavit in the file because a sufficient level of scienter
was not met, in part because of "weasel words" in the affidavit).
42. See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("Where public policy de-
mands a complete and accurate disclosure it may suffice to show nothing more than that the
misrepresentations were made in an atmosphere of gross negligence as to their truth.").
43. Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982 to replace any jurisdiction that the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.), the Court of Claims, and circuit courts had
over patent cases. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat.
25 (Apr. 2, 1982). Accordingly, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals
of patent cases and all appeals from the PTO, 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994), while the district
courts maintain original and exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994).
The purpose of creating a forum with jurisdiction over all patent cases was to provide uni-
formity in patent case decisions and to address the act of "shopping for a favorable venue."
See S. REP. No. 97-275, at 15 (1981); H.R. REP. No. 97-30, at 20-22 (1981).
44. The Federal Circuit considered the decisions of the C.C.P.A. and the Court of
Claims as a "presumptively controlling standard." See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d
1368,1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
45. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418,1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
46. 835 F.2d 1411,1415 & n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
47. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir.
1999]
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III. THE LEGAL STANDARD TODAY
In part due to the Federal Circuit's softening of the legal standard in
its early years,4 the court was faced with an ever-increasing docket of
appeals for inequitable conduct decisions sufficient to elicit disapproving
dictum from several Federal Circuit judges. Senior Circuit Judge Nich-
ols observed that "the habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost
every major patent case has become an absolute plague."'49 Circuit
Judge Lourie expounded that "[u]njustified accusations may deprive
patentees of their earned property rights and impugn fellow profession-
als."'  Chief Judge Markey stated that "'inequitable conduct' is not, or
should not be, a magic incantation to be asserted against every pat-
entee.""
In general, inequitable conduct occurs today when a person having
the duty of candor fails "to disclose material information, or [submits]
false information, with an intent to deceive.... ,52 Such information is
relevant to the patentability of the claimed invention and the conditions
of patentability found in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, including information
pertaining to novelty, obviousness, and loss of right or statutory bars
(e.g., public use, on-sale activity). There is not, however, a duty to dis-
close all prior art or to conduct a prior art search;53 but there is a duty to
disclose what an individual knows.'M When considering whether an in-
vention is patentable or a patent is valid in an anticipation or obvious-
ness context, knowledge of the prior art is not required.5 Unlike antici-
1988) (en banc) (citation omitted).
48. See Goldman, supra note 11, at 85-86.
49. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see Mo-
lins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Circuit Judge Lourie stating
"unjustified accusations ... are offensive and unprofessional . . . [and) should be con-
demned.").
50. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1182.
51. FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
52. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (en banc).
53. See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
54. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1182.
55. To anticipate a claimed invention, the prior art may be patents or publications un-
known to the applicant or patentee, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), or secret prior art, 35 U.S.C. § 102(e),
(g). When considering whether an application or patent is obvious, the applicant/patentee is
presumed to know all analogous prior art. See In re Antle, 444 F.2d 1168, 1171 (C.C.P.A.
1971). Analogous prior art includes all prior art in the inventor's field of endeavor and prior
art outside the inventor's field of endeavor that is reasonably pertinent to the particular
problem at hand. See id at 1171-72; cf International Cellucotton Prod. Co. v. Sterilek Co., 94
[Vol. 82:845
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pation and obviousness prior art, the applicant is not presumed to know
certain information; in fact, the court will consider a "good faith" ex-
cuse. 6 In general, the persons having the duty of candor are those asso-
ciated with the prosecution of the patent application.5 Specifically, Rule
56(c) provides that those having the duty of candor are "(1) [e]ach in-
ventor named in the application; (2) [e]ach attorney or agent who pre-
pares or prosecutes the application; and (3) [e]very other person who is
substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the applica-
tion and who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee or with
anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application.""8
A. Test for Inequitable Conduct
The test for inequitable conduct is commonly broken down into two
parts: first, threshold levels of materiality of the information omitted or
misrepresented and intent to deceive the PTO must be met; second, af-
ter the threshold levels are met, the courts balance materiality and in-
tent to determine whether inequitable conduct has occurred' 9  The
party alleging inequitable conduct has the burden of establishing the
minimum thresholds for materiality and intent:' "[P]roof [of inequita-
ble conduct] may be rebutted by a showing that (a) the prior art.., was
not material, (b) ... the applicant did not know of that art or informa-
tion, (c) ... the applicant did not know of its materiality,... (d) [nondis-
closure did not intend] to mislead the PTO,"1 or (e) good faith on the
part of persons having a duty under Rule 56(c). 2 Materiality and intent
F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1938) ("[W]e must suppose the inventor to be endowed, as in fact no in-
ventor is endowed; we are to impute to him knowledge of all that is not only in his immediate
field, but in all fields nearly akin to that field."). The Federal Circuit explained that "[a] ref-
erence is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the
inventor's endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would
have commended itself to an inventor's attention in considering his problem." In re Clay, 966
F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
56. See FMC, 835 F.2d at 1416; Molins, 48 F.3d at 1182. The situation where the refer-
ences were in the possession of the applicant, but they did not "know" about them has been
brought before the Federal Circuit.
57. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c) (1997).
58. Id.
59. See Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Molins, 48
F.3d at 1178.
60. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1178 ("One who alleges inequitable conduct arising from a
failure to disclose prior art must offer clear and convincing proof of the materiality of the
prior art, knowledge chargeable to the applicant of that prior art and of its materiality, and
the applicant's failure to disclose the prior art, coupled with an intent to mislead the PTO.").
61. FMC, 835 F.2d at 1415.
62. See Baxter Int'l, 149 F.3d at 1330 ("[E]vidence of good faith must be considered in
1999]
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are generally considered factual issues, but the ultimate determination
of inequitable conduct is an equitable issue committed to the discretion
of the trial court.63
The test for inequitable conduct is a product of common law and
legislation. The test is codified in the Rules and Regulations of the De-
partment of Commerce, promulgated by the PTO, in 37 C.F.R. § 1.56-
often referred to as "Rule 56." 4
1. Materiality
The Federal Circuit has stated that several tests may be used in de-
termining the minimum threshold of materiality," but that PTO Rule 56
is the appropriate starting point.66 Before 1992, materiality under Rule
56 required "a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would
consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to is-
sue as a patent."67 The Federal Circuit accepted this guideline by noting
that it is meant to describe how an applicant ought to conduct business
with the PTO.' Further, the court stated that "the pertinent inquiry
[under the reasonable examiner standard] is not whether a reasonable
determining whether inequitable conduct has been shown by clear and convincing evidence.
However, good faith is only one factor to be considered along with the totality of the evi-
dence." (citation omitted)).
63. See Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1439-40 (Fed
Cir. 1991).
64. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1998). Actually, Rule 56 was a "codification" of preexisting
case law. See 42 Fed. Reg. 5588,5593 (Jan. 28, 1977).
65. Historically, there have been four tests that establish the threshold of materiality:
(1) objective "but-for"; (2) subjective "but-for"; (3) "but it may have been"; and (4) PTO
Rule 56, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977). American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725
F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The "but-for" test provides the most objective and highest
standard for materiality. The information is material if but-for its non-disclosure, the patent
would not have issued. See generally PETER D. ROSENBERG, 2 PATENT LAW
FUNDAMENTALS § 15.08[1][b][i], at 15-186 (1986) ("Under the 'but for' test, the alleged im-
proper conduct does not render a patent invalid or unenforceable unless that conduct was the
effective cause of the issuance of the patent. Stated in other words, the conduct must have
been such that the patent would not have issued but for the complained-of acts.").
66. See Halliburton, 925 F.2d at 1440; J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553,
1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984); American Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1363.
67. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1977) (emphasis added). This was the rule promulgated by the
PTO and on the books between 1977 and 1992 and became known as the reasonable-
examiner standard. The reasonable-examiner standard does not require that "but-for" the
misconduct, the patent would not have issued. American Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1362-63. This
standard received a variety of interpretations by the circuits, C.C.P.A., and Federal Circuit.
68. See Critikon, 120 F.3d at 1257; Halliburton, 925 F.2d at 1440; American Hoist, 725
F.2d at 1363.
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examiner would want to be aware of a particular thing, but whether, af-
ter he was aware of it, he would 'consider it important' in deciding
whether to reject one or more claims."69 An objective standard of "rea-
sonable" examiners and "importance" of prior art has led to significant
discussion in judicial opinions and many law review articles. In 1992, the
PTO amended Rule 56!0 Revised Rule 56 abandons the reasonable-
examiner materiality standard in favor of a prima facie unpatentability
materiality standard.7 Although the Federal Circuit noted the PTO rule
change, it has not yet provided a substantive review of the new standard,
mostly because the rule is not retroactive n and patents subject to the
new rule are not those currently in litigation.
In order to satisfy the duty of candor, material information must be
disclosed to the PTO.' Material information required to be disclosed
69. American Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1362 n.2.
70. The amended, prima facie standard became effective on March 16,1992. See 57 Fed.
Reg. 2021,2034 (Jan. 17,1992).
71. The revised rule provides that unless information is cumulative to information al-
ready disclosed, the information is material to patentability if:
(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a prima facie
case of unpatentability of a claim; or
(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in:
(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or
(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.
A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when the information compels a
conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of the evidence,
burden-of-proof standard, giving each term in the claim its broadest reasonable con-
struction consistent with the specification, and before any consideration is given to
evidence which may be submitted in an attempt to establish a contrary conclusion of
patentability.
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (1998).
72. Specifically, the court stated in a footnote that administrative rules are not consid-
ered retroactive unless the rule so states and therefore declined to comment. See Molins PLC
v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1179 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,208 (1988)). The PTO notice of final rule making states that the revised
Rule 56 "will be applicable to all applicants and reexamination proceedings pending or filed
after March 16,1992." 57 Fed. Reg. 2021 (Jan. 17, 1992).
This standard is more narrow than the reasonable examiner standard; that is, there is less
information that is considered material. See infra Part IV.A. The higher standard may re-
duce the amount of appeals by clarifying the test and making the claim or defense more diffi-
cult to establish.
73. Satisfaction of this duty does not require that the applicant search the prior art. See
37 C.F.R. § 1.97(g); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 609, at 600-103 (7th ed.
1998) (addressing 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.97, 1.98) ("[T]he filing of an information disclosure state-
ment shall not be construed as a representation that a search has been made. There is no re-
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includes:74 (1) prior art references not known to the examiner;75 (2) con-
duct relevant to statutory bars (e.g., on-sale and public use);76 (3) docu-
ments required by the PTO, submitted by the applicant, including data,"
date of invention affidavit,78 and enablement affidavit;79 (4) references
made immaterial by amendments or deletion of claims; and (5) foreign
patent office search reports on a companion application (even though
the claims may be different, the reference may still be material).,o Mate-
rial information is disclosed to the PTO in Information Disclosure
Statements (IDS).8 A patentee has no obligation, however, to disclose
a reference if it is cumulative or if it is less material than those already
before the examiner.2 When considering whether references are cu-
mulative or less material than other references, the Federal Circuit
stated that a trial court "considers similarities and differences between
prior art and the claims of the patent." 3 A reference is not considered
quirement that an applicant for a patent make a patentability search." (citation omitted)).
74. See generally 6 CHISUM, supra note 9, § 19.03[21.
75. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1184-85.
76. Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1993); La-
Bounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
77. See Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
78. See Timely Prod. Corp. v. Stanley Arron, 523 F.2d 288 (Fed. Cir. 1975).
79. See Norberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
80. See Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG v. Hantscho Commercial Prod., Inc., 21 F.3d
1068, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
81. An IDS is a mechanism which requires the PTO examiner to consider prior art
known to the applicant. Information listed in an IDS that is considered by the PTO satisfies
the applicant's burden. Filing of an IDS, however, "shall not be construed to be an admission
that the information cited in the statement is, or is considered to be, material to patentability
as defined in [Rule 56(b)]." 37 C.F.R. § 1.97(h) (1997). The PTO rules are designed to cause
prompt and early disclosure. See generally id. § 1.97. The IDS must include a list of all pat-
ents, publications, or other information submitted for consideration by the PTO and a copy of
each United States patent, foreign patent, and publication or portion that caused it to be
listed. See id § 1.98(a). If the document is not in English, a "concise explanation of the rele-
vance, as it is presently understood by the individual designated in [Rule 56(c)] most knowl-
edgeable about the content of the information .... ." See id § 1.98(a)(3). Otherwise, the ap-
plicant is not required to provide any explanation of the relevance or reason for listing a
document in the IDS.
82. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (1997) (providing an exception to information that is "cumu-
lative to information already of record or being made of record in the application"); see also
Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1440, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1991); accord
Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996), vacated on other
grounds, 520 U.S. 1111 (1997); Molins, 48 F.3d at 1182; Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v.
Genentech, 927 F.2d 1565, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
83. Halliburton, 925 F.2d at 1441. Additionally, the "the trial court must consider por-
tions of prior art references which teach away from the claimed invention." Id.
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immaterial if it does not make a claim unpatentable. 4 Although undis-
covered material information that is insufficient to render the invention
unpatentable is not a defense to inequitable conduct, "[t]here is no pre-
sumption that information not filed by an applicant was material simply
because patentability ensued.""6 Perhaps the most common source of
knowledge of material references arises from foreign patent offices
evaluating a similar patent and conducting prior art searches."
2. Intents
Inequitable conduct also requires the intent to deceive the PTO as to
the patentability of the inventor.89 The party asserting inequitable con-
duct must show by clear and convincing evidence that there was an in-
tent to deceive the PTO.' ° Intent to deceive may be proven by direct
evidence or inferred from circumstantial evidence. 9' Because direct evi-
dence is rarely found, inferences from surrounding circumstances gener-
84. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1179; Merck & Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418,
1421 (Fed. Cir. 1989); A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 798 F.2d 1392, 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
References are important for novelty and nonobviousness reasons.
85. See A.B. Dick, 798 F.2d at 1399.
86. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340,1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
87. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1180 (quoting M.P.E.P. § 2001.06(a) (1981)).
88. Different areas of the law have interpreted intent in various ways. For instance, in-
tent in a criminal law context may mean "[d]esign, resolve, or determination with which [a]
person acts." BLACK'S LAV DICTIONARY 810 (6th ed. 1990). Intent in tort law occurs where
the "actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that he believes that the conse-
quences are substantially certain to result from it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
8A (1965). Tortious intent is not dependent on the actor understanding that the intended
consequences constitute a tort. See Ranson v. Kitner, 31 Ill. App. 241 (1889). And, when one
has tortious intent, one is liable for unintended consequences as well as intended conse-
quences. See Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 898 (Wis. 1979). In criminal law, in-
tent is given a related meaning. Common law criminal intent exists when one desires to cause
the social harm or is acting "with knowledge that the social harm is virtually certain to occur
as a result of his conduct." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §
10.04[A][1] (2d ed. 1995) (citing Mill v. State, 585 P.2d 546, 549 (Alaska 1978)). Also, under
the Model Penal Code, purposefully, in a conduct or a result context, is a "conscious object to
engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result" MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02(2)(a)(i) (1985).
89. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir.
1988). Prior to Kingsdown, the Federal Circuit allowed gross negligence to satisfy this ele-
ment. See id. at 876; see also American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d
1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
90. See Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
91. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1182 ("Generally, intent must be inferred from the facts and
circumstances surrounding the applicant's conduct."); see also Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v.
KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1189-90 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Moreover, direct evidence is rarely
available. See Merck & Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418,1422 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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ally must be drawn. 9  Courts do, however, recognize limits to infer-
ences.
93
In Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., the Fed-
eral Circuit, en banc, addressed the second element of inequitable con-
duct and issued a "Resolution of Conflicting Precedent," stating that "a
finding that particular conduct amounts to 'gross negligence' does not of
itself justify an inference of intent to deceive; the involved conduct,
viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of good
faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to
deceive."94 Although an applicant must have known or be chargeable
with knowledge of the material information's existence "for it is impos-
sible to disclose the unknown,""5 the materiality of an undisclosed refer-
ence does not presume intent to deceive the PTO.96 Thus, because the
applicant must be chargeable with knowledge of the materiality of the
material information, a court may not find intent solely on the basis that
the applicant "should have known" of the materiality." All the evi-
92. See Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
93. See FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("An infer-
ence can and often must be drawn from established facts and direct proof of wrongful intent
is not required, but drawing an inference on an inference on an inference is not the role of the
fact finder.") (footnote omitted).
94. 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). But cf. Modine Mfg. Co. v. Al-
len Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming a district court's determination that
inequitable conduct occurred where there was recklessness).
95. FMC, 835 F.2d at 1415.
96. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1178; Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d
1440, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 839 F.2d 1556, 1567 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
97. Gross negligence occurs "when a reasonable person 'should have known of the ma-
teriality of a withheld reference."' FMC, 835 F.2d at 1414-15 n.9 (construing J.P. Stevens &
Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). Despite the resolution of conflict-
ing precedent in Kingsdown, there is the possibility for confusion because of the "should have
known" language used for materiality and intent standards. In Nordberg, the Federal Circuit
explained that "should have known" is not the proper standard for determining knowledge of
a prior art's existence, but is sometimes used to infer the patentee's knowledge of a known
prior art's materiality. See Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394, 397 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
The court found that although the material prior art was owned by the patentee and a copy
was found in the patentee's files, the district court properly determined that the individuals
having a duty of disclosure were unaware of the patent in light of the facts that the files con-
tained hundreds of patents and at the time, and the files were not searched during prosecu-
tion. Thus, knowledge of the materiality is closely related to the intent to deceive element.
Because "gross negligence" alone is not sufficient to constitute intent, courts generally must
rely on inferred conduct (known or should have known) and the surrounding circumstances
(aggravating circumstances) to overcome the gross negligence "threshold." See, e.g., Critikon,
Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding
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dence, including evidence of good faith, must be considered before
finding deceptive intent. 8 Further, intent is not established where in-
formation is intentionally withheld from the PTO if the PTO actually
considers the undisclosed prior art. 9
In sum, since Kingsdown, the Federal Circuit has required either an
affirmative misrepresentation to the PTO, or a nondisclosure of infor-
mation and an aggravating circumstance.' Although intent may no
longer be established by gross negligence,'0 ' "negligent conduct... sup-
port[s] an inference of intent only when, 'viewed in light of all the evi-
dence, including evidence indicative of good faith,' the conduct is culpa-
ble enough to require a finding of intent to deceive.""
2
3. Weighing of Materiality and Intent
After the threshold levels of materiality and intent are established,
"the [trial] court must weigh them to determine whether the equities
warrant a conclusion that inequitable conduct occurred."'0 3 Further-
more, courts must consider "the involved conduct 'in light of all the evi-
dence' and must then determine whether that conduct in its totality
manifests a sufficiently culpable state of mind to warrant a determina-
tion that it was inequitable..".''  A high level of materiality or intent may
offset a low level of the other."ce
that Critikon knew of the prior art reference, knew or should have known of its materiality,
did not provide a good faith explanation for not disclosing it, and did not disclose relevant
information to the PTO in a reissue proceeding). Accordingly, although "[t]here is no pre-
sumption that information not filed by an applicant was material simply because patentability
ensued[,] ... [d]eceptive intent is not inferred simply because information was in existence
that was not presented to the examiner." C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
98. See Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876.
99. See Litton Sys. Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996), vacated
on othe grounds, 520 U.S. 1111 (1997); Molins, 48 F.3d at 1185; Scripps Clinic & Research
Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565,1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
100. See Goldman, supra note 11, at 84.
101. See Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876. "Gross negligence cannot elevate itself by its figu-
rative boot-straps to an intent to mislead based on the identical factors used to establish gross
negligence in the first instance unless all the facts and circumstances indicate sufficient culpa-
bility." Halliburton, 925 F.2d at 1443.
102. Halliburton, 925 F.2d at 1443 (quoting Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876).
103. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1178 ("In light of all the circumstances, an equitable judgment
must be made concerning whether the applicant's conduct is so culpable that the patent
should not be enforced."); J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559-60.
104. Molins, 48 F.3d at f181 (citation omitted) (quoting Consolidated Aluminum Corp.
v. Foseco Int'l, Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
105. See Halliburton, 925 F.2d at 1439 ("The more material the omission or misrepresen-
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Moreover, "[i]ntent to deceive should be determined in light of the
realities of patent practice, and not as a matter of strict liability what-
ever the nature of the action before the PTO."'O' "'A patentee's over-
sights are easily magnified out of proportion by one accused of in-
fringement .... ""0 In other words, the courts are to decide inequitable
conduct on a "totality of the circumstances" standard after threshold
levels of intent and materiality are established. 1m
B. Standard of Review
The Federal Circuit has attempted to address the problems of ineq-
uitable conduct by granting greater deference to the trial court which
would then be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. ° The
Federal Circuit's heightened, and uncharacteristic, 110 deference to a trial
court's determinations regarding inequitable conduct,"' and the subse-
quent review under an abuse of discretion standard, is intended to curb
appeals from a trial court's decision on an inequitable conduct issue. 12
Previously, inequitable conduct was considered a question of law and
reviewed de novo,"3 which led to frequent appeals on an issue that was
tation, the less intent required and vice versa"), accord Akron Polymer Container Corp. v.
Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Litton, 87 F.3d at 1570; FMC, 835
F.2d at 1416; American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
106. Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (cita-
tion omitted).
107. Id. (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 196 (8th Cir.
1976)); see also Molins, 48 F.3d at 1182.
108. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 129 F.3d 1463, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
109. See Goldman, supra note 11, at 86-87 (construing Kingsdown Med. Consultants,
Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
110. The Federal Circuit applies significantly less deference than most other district
courts' determinations. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see generally
Craig A. Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the UsefulArts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415 (1995).
111. See, e.g., Key Pharmaceuticals v. Hercon Laboratories Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 719(Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that the trial court's determination on intent was not clearly er-
roneous because "the finding on intent in particular depend[s] heavily on the presentation of
evidence and witness testimony at trial. The trial court [is] able to hear these matters first
hand and assess witness credibility.").
112. See Goldman, supra note 11, at 86-87 (construing Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876).
113. See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("Ma-
teriality and intent are factual issues subject to the clearly erroneous standard," but whether
inequitable conduct occurred is determined as a matter of law. (citation omitted)); American
Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1364. Today, under the abuse of discretion standard, "the appellant must
establish that the ruling is based upon clearly erroneous findings of fact or a misapplication of
applicable law, or that the ruling evidences a clear error of judgment." See Kingsdown, 863
F.2d at 876; Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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rarely proven and may be seen as attempts to smear the otherwise good
faith conduct of an inventor or attorney.
Under the current .standard, materiality and intent remain factual
threshold issues, which must be proved by clear and convincing evidence
by the party asserting inequitable conduct." 4 The Federal Circuit re-
views these underlying factual issues for clear error."5 The court's ulti-
mate determination of inequitable conduct is not a question of law,
6
but reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. 17 Thus, the ap-
pellant must demonstrate that "the ruling is based upon clearly errone-
ous findings of fact or a misapplication or misinterpretation of applica-
ble law or that the ruling evidences a clear error of judgment.....
C. Effect of Inequitable Conduct
The effect of a finding of inequitable conduct on a patent or a patent
application is quite severe."9 Inequitable conduct renders the entire
patent unenforceable.'2" Unenforceability applies to claims affected by
114. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 1584 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
115. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (1998); ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534,547 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
116. See Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876. If inequitable conduct were a question of law, it
would receive plenary review. Such review would further increase the appeals of inequitable
conduct determinations because parties receiving the unfavorable decision would have a sec-
ond chance to argue the record on de novo review.
117. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1178.
118. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876 (quoting PPG Indus. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties
Co., 840 F.2d 1565,1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); Molins, 48 F.3d at 1182.
119. See Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1383
(Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Although the conduct giving rise to judgments of unenforceability... oc-
curs before the examiner, the offense deserves its penalty because the processes of the PTO
have been transgressed." (emphasis added)).
120. See J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1561 (addressing the issue of invalidity versus unen-
forceability and noted that "[i]t is an all or nothing proposition" (citation omitted));
Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 877. Prior to J.P. Stevens, there was confusion as to whether inequi-
table conduct made an issued patent invalid or unenforceable. Compare Connell v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (affirming a holding of not enforceable due to
fraud, but added that inequitable conduct does not encompass the test for a Walker Process
type of claim), with Rohm and Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1983). Further, the Supreme Court in Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Mainte-
nance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945), discussed inequitable conduct in terms of enforceabil-
ity. However, in Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965), the Supreme Court discussed fraud in terms of invalidity. Such distinction led to two
defenses where "fraud" rendered the patent invalid and inequitable conduct rendered the
patent unenforceable. J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1560 (construing Timely Prod. Corp. v. Stan-
ley Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 297 (2d Cir. 1975)); In re Multidistrict Litig. Involving Frost Patent,
398 F. Supp. 1353, 1367-68 (D. Del. 1975). "Walker Process claims" apply to antitrust coun-
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the inequitable conduct as well as unrelated claims. Therefore, even if
inequitable conduct can be attributed to only one claim and the patent
contains multiple claims, every claim is unenforceable despite being
otherwise equitably attained. Also, an accused infringer that success-
fully raises an inequitable conduct defense may be awarded attorney
fees.1
2 1
In addition to rendering the entire patent unenforceable, other pat-
ents related to the unenforceable patent may also be unenforceable un-
der the doctrine of unclean hands. 2 The doctrine of unclean hands is a
"self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity to one
tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which
he seeks relief, however improper.., the behavior of the defendant,"'2
and applies "where some unconscionable act of one coming for relief
has immediate and necessary relation to the equity that he seeks in re-
spect of the matter in litigation."' 24 As the court in Consolidated Alumi-
num stated, "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands in
determining whether inequitable conduct in procuring one patent-in-suit
requires a holding that the other patents-in-suit are unenforceable."'2
Thus, when inequitable conduct regarding one patent permeates the
prosecution of related patents, they may all be rendered unenforce-
able.' 2 However, in the case where the PTO imposes a restriction re-
terclaims. See supra note 5.
121. See Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Generally, attorney fees are awarded under 35 U.S.C. § 285, which provides in part: "[t]he
court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." 35
U.S.C. § 285 (1994). Case law has developed requirements necessary for an award of fees un-
der 35 U.S.C. § 285: "(1) the case must be exceptional, (2) the district court may exercise its
discretion, (3) the fees must be reasonable, and (4) the fees may be awarded only to the pre-
vailing party." Gentry, 135 F.3d at 1480 (citation omitted) (stating "[w]hen a plaintiff suc-
ceeds only in overcoming a defense raised to the claims it sought in bringing suit, the plaintiff
is not 'the prevailing party."').
122. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1182; Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l, Ltd.,
910 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
123. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 814 (1945).
124. Consolidated Aluminum, 910 F.2d at 810 (quoting Keystone Driller Co. v. General
Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240,245 (1933)).
125. 910 F.2d at 809.
126. See, e.g., id. at 1810 (explaining that rendering related patents unenforceable be-
cause of unclean hands may be appropriate where "there is more than mere relatedness of
subject matter; [for example,] the prosecution histories of the patents-in-suit establish that
[the patentee's] inequitable conduct in prosecuting the ... patent had [an] immediate and
necessary relation to the equity [the patentee] seeks, namely the enforcement of [the related]
patents.").
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quirement, and untainted claims are separated from claims tainted by
inequitable conduct and subsequently issue a divisional patent," the is-
sued patent is not also unenforceable due to inequitable conduct com-
mitted in the parent application if "the issued claims have no relation to
the omitted prior art."''
D. Categories of Information Giving Rise to Potential Inequitable
Conduct Claims and Defenses
There are several circumstances that can give rise to inequitable
conduct issues. First, inequitable conduct may occur where those having
the duty of candor fail to disclose known prior art, including patents or
printed publications.' 29
Second, inequitable conduct may occur when an applicant buries
material information in a list of immaterial information that is submitted
or represented to the PTO as a disclosure of relevant information.3'
"Burial" allegations may sometimes be avoided by explaining the rele-
vance of disclosed information to the examiner; however, such extra
communication regarding the prior art may later be used in a prosecu-
tion history estoppel defense. 3' Today, it is not necessary for the patent
127. A restriction requirement occurs when the examiner determines that more than
one invention has been claimed. The statutory basis is found in the patent code. See 35
U.S.C. § 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers... may obtain a patent therefore .... .") (em-
phasis added); id. § 121. If an applicant claims "two or more independent and distinct inven-
tions," the PTO can require the applicant to restrict the application to one invention or a sub-
set of the inventions. 35 U.S.C.S. § 121. See IRAH H. DONNER, PATENT PROSECUTION:
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE BEFORE THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE 686 (1996). After the restric-
tion requirement, the applicant must "elect" the claims in the original application for contin-
ued prosecution. See id. Then, the claims of the non-elected inventions are canceled and may
be resubmitted in a subsequent divisional application. The policy rational is that the fee is for
only one invention. There are several bases for restriction, including: "each distinct inven-
tion has a separate classification in the [PTO] patent classification system; ... each distinct
invention has a separate status in the art;... or a different field of search is necessary for each
distinct invention." I. at 687.
128. See Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The
[patent containing the untainted claims] is not unenforceable due to inequitable conduct
merely because its claims were improperly included in an application with other patentable
inventions that were ultimately held unenforceable for inequitable conduct."). In Baxter Int'l,
the omitted references were material to the parent application, but were not antecedents to
the claims that later issued from a divisional application because the claimed invention in the
divisional patent "should never have been included in the [parent application] in the first
place." I
129. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 1584 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
130. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172,1183 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
131. Prosecution history estoppel, or "file wrapper estoppel," is a defense to infringe-
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applicant to state the relevance of disclosed prior art."2 However, where
material information is hidden amongst immaterial information, the
court becomes suspicious and may find that inequitable conduct oc-
curred.'33
Third, and perhaps the most obvious example of breaching the duty
of candor owed to the PTO, inequitable conduct may occur by submit-
ting false or misleading affidavits."3' Often, patent applicants submit af-
fidavits in support of their application. Affidavits are sworn statements
that contain factual and opinion evidence concerning the patentability
of their invention. The Federal Circuit applies greater scrutiny to affi-
davits because intent is bolstered by the affirmative act of submitting the
affidavit, and materiality is inherent even if it is cumulative.35
Finally, failure to disclose public use or on-sale activity may consti-
tute inequitable conduct. 6
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Higher Materiality Standard in Revised Rule 56
Because the revised PTO standard for inequitable conduct is retro-
active, it has not yet received substantive application by the Federal Cir-
cuit.'37 The courts should welcome the new standard for inequitable
conduct, which offers a narrower standard. Making the standard for
rendering a patent unenforceable for inequitable conduct more difficult
ment by equivalency where the patentee makes statements or admissions during patent
prosecution that limits the scope of a claim. By explaining the relevance of a disclosed prior
art, the applicant, arguably, is stating what his invention is not. Previously, the Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure (M.P.E.P.) provided that failure to state the relevance of a dis-
closed prior art may be a breach of the duty to disclose. See M.P.E.P. § 2002.03 (Apr. 1980).
132. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 (1997).
133. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1183-84.
134. See generally Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1190-91
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
135. See Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Affidavits can give rise to many types of inequitable conduct, including failure to disclose
known material facts, see Hoffman-La Roche v. Lemmon Co., 906 F.2d 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
omission of relevant unfavorable test data, see Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722
F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983); misrepresenting the state of the art at the filing date, see B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 72 F.3d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996); and misrepre-
senting commercial success, see Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc.,
976 F.2d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
136. Public use and on-sale activity give rise to novelty and loss of right issues, which
precludes the grant of a patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b).
137. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1179 n.8 (citation omitted).
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to meet has several benefits. First, a higher standard will discourage
some of the frivolous claims of inequitable conduct because clients
would be less inclined to pay for defenses that have no chance of suc-
ceeding. Second, raising the standard may make the inequitable deci-
sions more uniform because a higher standard would ensure that only
viable allegations of inequitable conduct are raised.
The most direct way to raise the standard for materiality would be
for the courts to adopt the revised Rule 56 and its narrow implications.1"
The revised rule replaces the "reasonable examiner" standard with a
"prima facie" standard. Specifically, Rule 56 provides in part:
(b) information is material to patentability when it is not cumula-
tive to information already of record or being made of record in
the application, and
(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other in-
formation, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or
(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant
takes in:
(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by
the Office, or
(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.
A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when the in-
formation compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable un-
der the preponderance of evidence, burden-of-proof standard,
giving each term in the claim its broadest reasonable construc-
tion consistent with the specification, and before any considera-
tion is given to evidence which may be submitted in an attempt
to establish a contrary conclusion of patentability.39
This standard requires a higher degree of materiality than merely re-
138. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1997).
139. l In the Notice of Final Rule making, the PTO stated that
Section 1.56 [Rule 56] has been amended to present a clearer and more objective
definition of what information the [PTO] considers material to patentability. The
rules do not define fraud or inequitable conduct which have elements both of mate-
riality and of intent. The [PTO] does not advocate any change to the Kingsdown
ruling.
Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2024 (Jan. 17, 1992). The Kingsdown ruling resolved
the conflicting precedent on the intent element. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v.
Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876-77 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Accordingly, by implication the PTO
promulgated the revised Rule 56 to advocate changes to the element of materiality.
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quiring that a reasonable examiner would consider certain evidence im-
portant.
The phrase "not cumulative" has its roots in case law." Accord-
ingly, this adds little to the previous standard.
Inequitable conduct, then, is established where noncumulative in-
formation renders a claim unpatentable by violating a condition of pat-
entability found in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.14' Alternatively, inequita-
ble conduct is established by undisclosed, noncumulative information
that, although does not render the claim unpatentable, refutes or is in-
consistent with a position the patentee had taken in opposing a PTO ar-
gument of unpatentability or in asserting an argument of patentability.
The latter alternative should be interpreted to simply codify the
proposition that an affirmative assertion that is an argument for, or a de-
fense of, patentability, which misrepresents certain facts, is a breach of
the duty of candor. The de minimis requirement, arguably, is inconsis-
tency; that is, if one agrees that "inconsistent" information is easier to
establish than information that "refutes."' 42  "Inconsistency" means
"[m]utually repugnant or contradictory."' 43 Such an inconsistency may
arise while opposing a PTO argument of unpatentability or while as-
serting an argument of patentability during prosecution. Thus, because
initial application itself is an argument of patentability, the revised stan-
dard provides that there may be inequitable conduct if there is inconsis-
tent information that is material.
The fact that "inconsistent information" must be actually known to
the applicant may seem to set a low standard, but the fact that it is rele-
vant to a position taken while opposing an argument of unpatentability
or asserting an argument of patentability actually bootstraps the stan-
dard into merely establishing misrepresentation. Thus, the revised lan-
guage of inconsistent information does not appear to add anything to
the previous test. Both tests would find that information is material that
is known to an applicant and is not disclosed, but the contrary is stated.
Further, courts uniformly find inequitable conduct when the patentee
actually lies to the PTO.'"
140. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1185; Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc.,
927 F.2d 1565, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
141. For example, the information anticipates the claimed invention or renders it obvi-
ous. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1994).
142. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1997).
143. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 766 (6th ed. 1990).
144. See, e.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automatic Maintenance Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806, 815 (1945); Corning Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461,
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The significant addition to the revised Rule is the prima facie unpat-
entability element. Rule 56 now provides that prima facie unpatent-
ability exists when the undisclosed information, alone or considered in
light of other disclosed or undisclosed information, compels a conclusion
of unpatentability when considered on the evidentiary preponderance of
the evidence standard." Put another way, prima facie materiality oc-
curs where information, more likely than not, compels a conclusion that
a claim is unpatentable. Further, the Rule states that prima facie unpat-
entability is determined without considering extrinsic evidence and by
construing a claim broadly and consistent with the specification.'16 Also,
the information may, by itself or "in combination with other informa-
tion," constitute prima facie unpatentability" There is no requirement
that the information combined with the tainted information must also be
material.
Accordingly, the new standard finds materiality in affirmative mis-
representations or information that more likely than not renders a pat-
ent invalid due to obviousness'm or anticipation.'49 Compared to the
previous standard, the threshold level of materiality is higher. Previ-
ously, materiality merely required a substantial likelihood that a reason-
able examiner would have considered the information important when
deciding whether to grant a patent.50 The precise quantum of suffi-
ciency of the evidence required under the old standard was not identi-
fied on a continuum. However, preponderance of the evidence is widely
known to represent more likely than not, or more than fifty percent.
The reasonable examiner standard is ambiguous and susceptible to
varied interpretations among district courts. The trend in patent law has
been to impose uniformity, fairness, and early certainty, in all aspects of
patent law. The revised standard does not quite constitute a "but-for"
test, but it is certainly an upward movement of the minimum threshold
requirement.
The new standard may work to instill uniformity and earlier cer-
tainty, but fairness is left wanting. By raising the minimum standard for
materiality, the net for inequitable conduct, theoretically, encompasses
469-70 (D. Del. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 374 F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 1967).
145. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (1997).
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994); see also CHISUM, supra note 9.
149. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994); see also CHISUM, supra note 9.
150. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1977); see also Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d
1576, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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less.
What happens when less is required to be disclosed? Naturally, less
will be disclosed. Less disclosure is not good. Not only will there be ad-
ditional good faith non-disclosures, but there will be additional bad faith
non-disclosures. By bad faith non-disclosures I mean those applicants
who chose to operate on the edge of proper conduct. Also, the maxim
"when in doubt, disclose it"'' may be rendered extinct if patentees are
given a bright line that they can argue instead of a general disclosure of
possibly relevant information mandate.
On the other hand, one could argue that the increased level of mate-
riality may serve to decrease the occurrence of inequitable conduct de-
fenses. This result, however, is doubtful. Unless there is significant re-
vision to inequitable conduct as a whole, it will remain as a checklist
defense that is only satisfied by contorting facts to satisfy a reasonable
inquiry.5 ' Perhaps one method of decreasing the propensity of the in-
equitable conduct defense is to make sanctions more available. Such
sanctions may include monetary awards, costs and attorney fees, or per-
haps prejudicial dismissal.
If the standard for materiality was to truly be heightened, there were
other, less attractive possible revisions that could have been imple-
mented. One way was to replace the "reasonable-examiner" standard
with a but-for test. Such a test would provide that but-for the patent
applicant's misrepresentation or purposeful omission, the patent would
not have issued.'53 A but-for test has been considered an appropriate
standard, but the courts consider Rule 56 to be an appropriate starting
place when making an inequitable conduct inquiry." Indeed, Rule 56
has also been the ending place for materiality inquiries; courts are satis-
fied with a conclusion based on minimum thresholds for materiality and
intent and a balance test.
A standard with the same effect as a but-for test could be attained by
requiring the party claiming inequitable conduct to establish, in essence,
151. LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1076
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
152. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) ("By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing,
submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances .....
153. See ROSENBERG, supra note 65.
154. See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
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common law fraud on the PTO.'55 This approach would include proving
that the PTO relied on the correctness of submitted information and
that the applicant disclosed all known material information.'56 However,
the courts have observed that the standard for inequitable conduct is
lower than that for common law fraud, which requires reliance on the
misrepresentation." The rationale for not requiring reliance is uncer-
tain, but it may be because of the monopoly that is granted to the pat-
entee.
Although adoption of a reliance element in inequitable conduct may
seem to produce the same results as a but-for test, they are, in fact,
markedly different. To satisfy a but-for test, one would have to prove
that the claimed invention is unpatentable."5 ' If the claimed invention
may be shown to be unpatentable, there is little benefit in proving the
extra elements for inequitable conduct, except to render the entire pat-
ent unenforceable, recover attorney's fees, or to have sanctions em-
ployed against the adverse party. Accordingly, a reliance requirement is
a higher standard than the reasonable-examiner test but not as extreme
as but-for.
Reliance may occur where the PTO was misdirected about material
references or distracted from material references; the applicant actually
deceived the examiner or otherwise affected the examination process; or
the applicant failed to provide a complete disclosure of known prior art.
Reliance does not require that the true information would have led to a
finding of unpatentability, only that the PTO accepted the representa-
tion as true and acted on its belief."9
155. The elements of common law fraud generally take the form of four elements: (1)
misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) intent to deceive or a state of mind so reckless as to
be the equivalent of scienter; (3) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (4) reliance
on the misrepresentation caused injury. See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 793 (C.C.P.A.
1970).
156. Reliance may not be difficult to prove. When an Information Disclosure Statement
is timely filed, the examiner must consider each of the disclosed references before determin-
ing patentability. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.97 (1997) (providing that "[a]n information disclosure
statement shall be considered by the [PTO] if filed [according to timing dependant filing re-
quirements]").
157. See J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559.
158. See ROSENBERG, supra note 65.
159. Reliance may be defined as "a belief which motivates an act;" whereas, in the tort
of deceit, reliance may be found where a misrepresentation is a substantial factor in another's
decision or conduct. BLACK'S LAW DICriONARY 1291 (6th ed. 1990).
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B. Deference to the District Court
The Federal Circuit should continue to give significant deference to
the district court's decision on inequitable conduct. Greater deference
creates earlier certainty in the enforceability of the patent.
Earlier certainty is good for society, the patentee, and the alleged in-
fringer. Society benefits by being able to rely on patents as a boundary
of protection, having confidence of what is and is not in the public do-
main; this encourages benchmarks to competitors to design around and
therefore increase innovation. By the time a lawsuit reaches the courts,
there has likely been substantial investment by the parties in research
and development and legal fees. Also, early certainty prevents the
waste of resources spent when litigating inequitable conduct, and allows
greater innovation. Early certainty is also beneficial to the patentee and
the alleged infringer because it may end litigation sooner or encourage a
settlement.
Also, greater deference to the trial court is in accord with the ac-
cepted understanding that the trial court is in a better position to judge
the credibility of the parties and testimony. This deference is significant
because many issues of inequitable conduct, particularly intent, will turn
on credibility.
Although the standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard,16
the actual deference given varies from case to case based on whether the
district court held that there was inequitable conduct. The Federal Cir-
cuit, perhaps to discourage frivolous inequitable conduct defenses, ap-
plies less deference when the district court determines that there was in-
equitable conduct.
C. Attorney-Client Confidentiality Conflict
Additional unresolved issues of inequitable conduct involve the ethi-
cal implications of nondisclosure of information known by the attorney
or nondisclosure by the client known by the attorney. 6' Two significant
ethical issues that arise in this context are disclosure of confidential in-
formation and client perjury known to the attorney. Both pose signifi-
cant ethical dilemmas for patent attorneys and leave little remedial op-
tions.1 6
2
160. See supra Part III.B.
161. See, e.g., Inequitable Conduct in Patent Procurement, supra note 17, at 301-02.
162. The patent statutes provide that the PTO may promulgate its own rules of legal
ethics and professional responsibility. See 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1994) ("The Commissioner, subject
to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, may prescribe regulations governing the rec-
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First, similar to the American Bar Association Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct (hereinafter "Model Rules"),' Canon 4 of the PTO
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] practitioner
should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."' ' An attorney
would not appear to be free to disclose confidential information of one
client that relates to the patentability of a claimed invention by a second
client. Thus, an attorney having a duty under Rule 56(c) to two unre-
lated clients is ethically precluded from disclosing, without consent, con-
fidential information of the first client during prosecution of the second
client's application even if it would render the second client's invention
unpatentable.
In Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., the defendants asserted, inter alia,
that the patent was unenforceable because of inequitable conduct on the
grounds that the attorney failed to disclose invalidating prior art from a
co-pending, unrelated patent application and prosecution." The court
ognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other
parties before the Patent and Trademark Office.... ."). The PTO has promulgated Canons
and Disciplinary Rules in the PTO Code of Professional Responsibility. See generally 37
C.F.R. §§ 10.40-10.112 (1998).
163. The Model Rules address, inter alia, attorney-client confidentiality of information,
and provides that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a cli-
ent unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1995) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; id. at Preamble ("A lawyer
should keep in confidence information relating to representation of a client except so far as
disclosure is required or permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.").
164. 37 C.F.R. § 10.56 (1998). The complementary disciplinary rule provides for the
preservation of confidences and secrets of a client: ,
Except when permitted under paragraph (c) of this section, a practitioner shall not
knowingly: (1) Reveal a confidence or secret of a client. (2) Use a confidence or se-
cret of a client to the disadvantage of the client.... (c) A practitioner may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client affected but only after a full
disclosure to the client. (2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Discipli-
nary Rules or required by law or court order. (3) The intention of a client to commit
a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.
37 C.F.R. § 10.57(b) (1998). "'Confidence' refers to information protected by the attor-
ney-client or agent-client privilege under applicable law. 'Secret' refers to other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client."
Id § 10.57(a).
165. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1185-86 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also
Todd M. Becker, Attorney-Client Privilege Versus the PTO's Duty of Candor: Resolving the
Clash in Simultaneous Patent Representations, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1035 (1996) (arguing that
the attorney-client privilege should override the duty of candor in concurrent representa-
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recognized that the dual representation created a "possible conflict of
interest" because one client's interest could be sacrificed for the other at
the same time committing inequitable conduct. '66 The Federal Circuit
avoided resolving the issue by asserting that the undisclosed reference
was merely cumulative.67 In dissent, however, Judge Nies argued that
the attorney's "representation of clients with conflicting interests pro-
vides no justification for deceiving the PTO."'"
Judge Newman, in a concurrence, disagreed with the dissent's asser-
tion that there may have been a duty to disclose.6 9 Specifically, Judge
Newman stated that the attorney's "obligation to preserve the confiden-
tiality of his client ... was absolute. [The attorney] had neither author-
ity nor obligation to breach the confidentiality of that client's pending
application, on behalf of a different client."'70 Judge Newman agreed
with the majority's finding that the reference was cumulative, but
stressed that regulations do not override client confidentiality.1
7
'
The second ethical dilemma that a patent attorney may face is ineq-
uitable conduct by the client. An attorney aware of a client's inequita-
ble conduct may have a duty to disclose the breach of the client's duty of
candor. During prosecution of an application, an applicant must file an
oath or declaration, and might file affidavits. 2  If the attorney has
knowledge of misrepresentations tantamount to inequitable conduct
tions); Inequitable Conduct in Patent Procurement, supra note 17, at 301-02.
166. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1185.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 1190 (Nies, J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 1193 n.1 (Newman, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 1192.
171. See id. at 1193. Judge Newman construed the M.P.E.P. § 2001.06(b) to require the
applicant to disclose copending applications owned by the same applicant, but not an unre-
lated client's copending application. See id. at 1192 (stating that M.P.E.P. § 2001.06(b) "re-
quires an applicant, and his or her attorney, to bring to the attention of the examiner informa-
tion 'as to other copending United States applications which are "material to patentability" of
the application in question."' (citation omitted)). Further, Judge Newman stated that other-
wise, attorneys would be required to breach the PTO's Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the Model Rules. Id. at 1193.
172. For example, before an application is examined by the PTO, the applicant must sign
and file a properly executed oath or declaration that identifies the application's specification,
identifies each inventor, and states the full inventorship. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.51(b), 1.63(a)
(1997). Also, applicants sometimes file affidavits in order to antedate a reference by swearing
behind examiner rejections made under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (e), or (g), see 37 C.F.R. § 1.131
(1997), or to offer evidence of patentability by the inventor or an expert, to rebut 35 U.S.C. §
103 (1994) rejections (e.g., offer evidence of secondary considerations), or to explain publica-
tions regarding the invention that lists more than one author but are not inventors, see 37
C.F.R. § 1.132 (1997).
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(e.g., perjury regarding the patentability of the claimed invention), the
attorney may be compelled to disclose the breach of the applicant's duty
of candor. Both the PTO Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Model Rules suggest that the attorney is not free to render legal services
to a client that would be conducting inequitable conduct."
Finally, if an ethical violation occurs or is imminent, an attorney has
only a few options. Generally, an attorney may either withdraw from
representation or disclose the unethical conduct. In Molins, Judge Nies,
in dissent, argued that the attorney's "representation of clients with con-
flicting interests provides no justification for deceiving the PTO. Ethics
required [the attorney] to withdraw."' 74 The PTO Disciplinary Rules
provide that "[a] practitioner shall not withdraw from employment in a
proceeding before the Office without permission from the Office (see §§
1.36 and 2.19 of this subchapter)."'75 Withdrawal may be mandatory or
permissible. An attorney must withdraw if "[t]he practitioner knows or
it is obvious that the practitioner's continued employment will result in
violation of a Disciplinary Rule . ,,.7' An attorney's actions consti-
tuting inequitable conduct (nondisclosure of material prior art) or client
perjury (false oath or declaration) violates the PTO Disciplinary Rules
and thus withdrawal is likely mandatory. However, even if an argument
can be made that the Disciplinary Rules are not violated, the attorney
clearly has the option to withdraw. The PTO rules provide that a practi-
tioner may request permission to withdraw if:
173. The PTO Code of Professional Responsibility provides that in representing a client
within the bounds of the law, an attorney shall not:
[1] Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law,
except that a practitioner may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported
by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
[2] Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which the practitioner is required by
law to reveal. [3] Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence. [4] Know-
ingly make a false statement of law or fact. [5] Participate in the creation or preser-
vation of evidence when the practitioner knows or it is obvious that the evidence is
false. [6] Counsel or assist a client in conduct that the practitioner knows to be ille-
gal or fraudulent. [7] Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary
to a Disciplinary Rule.
37 C.F.R. § 10.85(a) (1998); see id. § 10.84(b)(2) (1998) (providing that when representing a
client zealously, an attorney may: "Refuse to aid or participate in conduct that the practitio-
ner believes to be unlawful, even though there is some support for an argument that the con-
duct is legal."); cf. MODEL RULES, supra note 163, at Rules 1.2(d), (e).
174. Molins, 48 F.3d at 1190 (Nies, J., dissenting).
175. 37 C.F.R. § 10.40(a) (1998) (emphasis added).
176. Id- § 10.40(b)(2) (1998).
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(1) The petitioner's client: (i) Insists upon presenting a claim or
defense that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be
supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law; (ii) Personally seeks to pursue an ille-
gal course of conduct; (iii) Insists that the practitioner pursue a
course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited under a Dis-
ciplinary Rule;... (v) Insists, in a matter not pending before a
tribunal, that the practitioner engage in conduct that is contrary
to the judgment and advice of the practitioner but not prohibited
under the Disciplinary Rule ....
(2) The practitioner's continued employment is likely to result in
a violation of a Disciplinary Rule; ... or
(6) The practitioner believes in good faith, in a proceeding
pending before the Office, that the Office will find the existence
of other good cause for withdrawal."
Therefore, even if withdrawal is not mandatory, withdrawal is permissi-
ble and the right thing to do in order to uphold client confidences and
discharge of the attorney's ethical duties."'
Withdrawal, however, may not be the only remedy. The PTO Code
of Professional Responsibility provides that:
A practitioner who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) A client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon the
client to rectify the same, and if the client refuses or is unable to
do so the practitioner shall reveal the fraud to the affected per-
son or tribunal. (2) A person other than a client has perpetrated
a fraud upon a tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tri-
bunal. 9
177. 37 C.F.R. § 10.40(c) (1997); see id. § 10.66(b) (1998) ("A practitioner shall not con-
tinue multiple employment if the exercise of the practitioner's independent professional
judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the practitioner's
representation of another client, or if it would be likely to involve the practitioner in repre-
senting differing interests .... ); cf. MODEL RULES, supra note 163, at Rule 1.16(a) (1995);
id. at Rule 1.6 cmt. 15 ("If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially fur-
thering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw, as stated in
Rule 1.16(a)(1).").
178. See 37 C.F.R. § 10.110 (1998) ("A practitioner should avoid even the appearance of
professional impropriety.").
179. Id. § 10.85(b) (1998).
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Thus, if during later litigation the attorney discovers that the client had
perjured when signing the oath or declaration, the attorney may be re-
quired to disclose the inequitable conduct.
Accordingly, inequitable conduct raises ethical issues for an attor-
ney, whether the issues arise from information known to the attorney, or
through conduct by the client. Judge Newman is likely correct that cli-
ent confidentiality and canons of professional conduct override a ques-
tionable construction of the M.P.E.P. and the C.F.R. The bright-line
should be drawn between mere protection of client confidentiality
through non-disclosure and affirmative misrepresentation; for example,
in an affidavit, where an attorney chooses to expressly lie to the PTO.
Moreover, grounds for unenforceability and liability are available
through other equitable doctrines and causes of action, such as the
Walker Process claim.1 ° When faced with a clear ethical violation, the
best option for the attorney may be to withdraw from representing both
client patent applicants, thereby preserving client confidences and not
breaching her own duty of candor and professional responsibility.18 The
180. See supra note 5.
181. Such an issue was discussed at the State Bar of Wisconsin 1999 Midwinter Conven-
tion by a panel of three prominent patent attorneys addressing ethics and patent law. Round-
table Discussion II, Ethics and Patent Law at the State Bar of Wisconsin 1999 Midwinter
Convention Intellectual Property Law Section (Jan. 29, 1999). Members of the panel dis-
cussed two possible resolutions for when confidentiality conflicts with the duty of candor.
The panel was split as to whether the attorney must withdraw from one or both of the client
patent applicants.
One panel member stated that the attorney should withdraw from representing one of
the clients. The panel member added that the attorney must tell both clients that there is a
conflict or that there may be conflicting subject matter. As for the party losing the attorney's
representation, the panel member stated that the attorney should explain why the withdrawal
is necessary and suggest other firms that can handle the application. Further, the attorney
must tell the PTO what happened.
A second panel member stated that the attorney must withdraw from representing both
clients as soon as possible. Further, the panel member stated that the withdrawals cure the
duty to disclose. The panel member also added that in a perfect world, the attorney would
not have the second application because of conflicts checks.
A third panel member stated that the attorney must withdraw from representing both
clients because if you keep either, you know something material and it has to be disclosed.
The panel member added that the attorney should continue to control the case until it is
transferred so you have a record that you are disposed of the case.
Also, a speaker from an earlier program who works for the PTO Office of Enrollment
and Discipline, added that the PTO has not yet taken a position, but that the attorney should
withdraw from representing both clients. The PTO official added that there likely is a way to
withdraw before the duty of disclosure arises if done quickly enough. Otherwise, under 37
C.F.R. § 10.85, the withdrawing attorney could tell the client and then the client has the duty
to disclose, which lasts until the end of prosecution.
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ability to withdraw, although ethically preferred however, may often be
realistically impossible.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, although there are several unresolved issues and incon-
sistencies associated with inequitable conduct, the recent PTO revision
of the rule governing the duty of candor and issues raised in recent cases
indicate an agenda to reform the standard of inequitable conduct and
provide an opportunity for further reform.
The applicable standard to be followed by district courts when de-
termining materiality has not yet received any substantive review by the
Federal Circuit since its revision. The Federal Circuit should construe
the revised Rule 56 to require a heightened level of materiality. The ef-
fect of elevating the level of materiality coincides with basic principles of
patent law, provides earlier certainty and greater uniformity. Such a
construction does have its costs. Raising the standard may breed less
disclosure and should be carefully considered and expressly pronounced
by the courts. Further, the Federal Circuit should maintain its deference
to the district courts, in light of the new Rule.
Lastly, the Federal Circuit should take the opportunity, when pre-
sented, to verify that the scope of the attorney's duty to disclose is con-
trolled by client confidentiality and not controlled by juxtaposing agency
regulations.
SCOTr D. ANDERSON
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